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I. Introduction1 
The United States Court system currently has 93 vacancies 11 of which are in the Third 
Circuit/District and 51 pending nominees nationwide.
2
 To say that we have a vacancy problem is 
an understatement. The vacancies are straining the capacity of the federal court systems duty to 
administer justice in a timely and adequate manner. British politician and former Prime Minister 
William Ewart Gladstone famously said “justice delayed is justice denied”, one can’t help but 
conclude that the current state of affairs of the United States judicial system is not only a 
disservice to the principles of our government but a grave denial of justice to those awaiting their 
day in court.  
Bipartisan disputes, constant disagreement as well as a general reluctance to work together in 
the United States Senate with each other and with the President has only added to fuel to the 
problem of judicial vacancies.
3
  The use of the filibuster rule to require a 60-vote supermajority 
to confirm nominees gained popularity by Senate Democrats in 2000 as a way to block 
nominations made by then Republican President George W. Bush.
4
 Filibuster rules are currently 
being used by Senate Republicans to block judicial and other nominees made by President 
Barack Obama.
5
 With this fighting one can’t help but wonder if a change to the rules needs to be 
made. Use of the current judicial appointment model along with its rules and exceptions are short 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Professor Riccio, Professor at Seton Hall Law School for all of his help and guidance in 
putting this paper together. Additionally, I would like to thank the Hon. Marcelo Aguinksy, Hon. Jorge Luis 
Ballasteros, Hon. Gaston M. Polo Olivera, Hon. Silvia Y. Tanzi, Dr. Pablo Manilli, Dra. Yanina De Lucca, and 
Professor Sylvia Faerman for all of their help and valuable insight into the Argentine legal system as well as other 
models used in Latin America. Without the help of everyone mentioned this paper would have not been possible.   
2
 http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudicialVacancies.aspx. 
3
 Jackson, David. GOP Blocks another Obama Judicial Nominee. USA Today. Nov. 19, 2013. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/11/19/obama-judges-mitch-mcconnell-robe.   
4
 Savage, Charlie. Despite Filibuster Limits, a Door Remains Open to Block Judge Nominees. New York Times. 
Nov. 28, 2013. 
5
 Id.  
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of being abused by both ends of the appointment system.
6
 Is the problem being caused by the 
system or those in charge of the system? More importantly would reform and modification to the 
current system solve the problem of judicial vacancies. Republicans are refusing to confirm 
judicial nominees on the grounds that they are not qualified.
7
  If this is in fact the case would a 
modification to the current system in which we have a different method of finding qualified 
judges solve the problem. What modifications would result in more effective judicial 
appointments, especially in times of bipartisan reluctance to work together. 
Scholars, politicians and judges have started to look at the judicial appointment models of 
certain states, among those the state of New Jersey as alternatives.  As an adult I have spent a 
couple of years living abroad.  This has allowed me to see firsthand how other governments 
function, some use systems very similar to ours and others do not. Nonetheless they provide 
great insight into what works and what doesn’t.  Many of these countries have been under 
democratic rule for the past couple of decades, their recentness as well as analyzing they have 
borrowed from the United States system as well as the reasons why provides great insight into 
the strengths and weaknesses of our government. Studying the methods and processes by which 
certain foreign countries handle the appointment of judges would provide us with valuable 
insight and perhaps even an alternative to the model we use.    
Latin America is a beacon of new democracies. In the last 30 years democracy has sprouted 
in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela. Attaining democracy was no easy feat; the 
20
th
 century Latin America was a time of war, military coups, dictatorships, political 
suppression, and grave human rights violations. I grew up hearing stories of Los Desaparecidos 
in Argentina and El Estadio Nacional in Chile, events like these created distrust and dislike any 
                                                          
6
 Id. 
7
 Millhiser, Ian. Why Senate Democrats Had to Invoke the ‘Nuclear Option’.  ThinkProgress.org. Nov. 21, 2013. 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/11/21/2972671/senate-democrats-invoke-nuclear-option/ 
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form of government.
8
 The path to democracy left people with little hope in government and its 
elected officials.
9
 At times even though on paper these countries were democracies, the way in 
which they were managed not was not indicative of a democracy.  Additionally, the underlying 
assumption that corruption was rooted and entrenched at all levels of “el gobierno” (the 
government) was so accepted and commonplace that there wasn’t a political scandal or 
development that surprised anyone.  
One of the constant struggles in Latin America has been that of maintaining a true 
separation of powers between the government branches. A history of corruption and power grabs 
has only feed the problem however; in recent years many countries in Latin America have taken 
proactive efforts in one, prosecuting corruption within the government and two developing 
systems and procedures that seem to show a greater transparency to its people. Among these 
systems is an adoption of new models for judicial appointment.  More specifically, most of these 
countries have adopted the use of the judicial council as safe-guard to protect judicial 
independence as well as creating a degree of accountability.  
One of issues many countries in Latin American continue to struggle with is the hyper-
presidencies.
10
 In fact, this power grab from the executive branch happens so often that hyper-
presidencies are considered more the rule than the exception in Latin America.  Countries like 
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina have come up with systems that try to dilute 
the hyper-presidency problem. The constant battle to maintain these procedures and systems 
                                                          
8
 Los Desaparecidos or (The Vanished Ones) is the term used to reference the 9,000 to 30,000 Argentines that went 
missing during Argentina’s Dirty War between 1976-1983;  El Estadio Nacional de Chile (Chile National Stadium) 
was used as detention, torture, and execution center during the military coup of 1973 for musicians, political 
dissidents and members of the clergy. 
9
 Crossette, Barbara. Losing Faith in Democracy: A Warning from Latin America. The Atlantic.com: U.N. 
Notebook. Apr. 26, 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/foreign/unwire/crossette2004-04-26.htm 
10
 Hyper-Presidency is a term used to refer to a President or any head of the executive branch that has sweeping 
powers to rule at his or her discretion. This concentration of power in the President throws off the balance required 
in a democracy in that there is no separation of powers or a system of checks and balances.   
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intact has at times exposed the fragility of democracy in Latin America. One of these safeguard 
systems is the use of judicial council for the appointment of judges.  
When I clerked in Argentina the summer after my first year of law school I was 
fascinated by the method they used to appointing federal judges. El Consejo de la 
Magistratura de la República Argentina (Counsel of Magistrates of the Republic of Argentina), 
hereinafter “The Counsel”, is an integrated multispectral constitutional organ, responsible for 
making the shortlists of candidates to the judicial branch.
11
 They are also responsible for the 
sanctioning and firing of judges as well as the administration of the judicial system.
12
 Regulated 
by Article 114 of the National Constitution, it requires that The Counsel be integrated in such a 
way that all branches of the government are represented; it is therefore compromised of a 
thirteen-member council of judges, legislators, lawyers, and law professors.
13
 
For years The Counsel has earned the respect of its citizens and elected officials, due to 
its reputation of being fair and just, in fact it was rare that the President would not appoint a 
member recommended by The Counsel. Despite its initial success, in recent years the reputation 
of The Counsel has received harsh criticism regarding its function and form.
14
 In March 2013, 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner presented to Congress a six-point initiative that called 
for the La Democratizacion de la Justicia (Democratization of Justice).
15
 The six-point initiative 
proposed reforming The Counsel or getting rid of it altogether by adopting a model of judicial 
                                                          
11
 Poder Judicial de La Nacion: El Consejo  de Magistratura. http://www.consejomagistratura.gov.ar/.  
12
 Id.  
13
 Id.  
14
 Dura crítica de Fayt al Consejo de la Magistratura. lanacion.com: Política. July 27, 2009. 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1155453-dura-critica-de-fayt-al-consejo-de-la-magistratura. 
15
 Verón, Mariana. Cristina Kirchner avanza con la idea de la democratización de la Justicia. lanacion.com: 
Política. Feb. 5, 2013. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1551931-cristina-kirchner-avanza-con-la-idea-de-la-
democratizacion-de-la-justicia. 
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elections.
16
  The President reasoned that giving the judicial power to the people further 
legitimized its authority and power as well as rid it of possible corruption.
17
 This initiative has 
been widely criticized by judges, lawyers and academics as yet another attempt at a power grab 
from the executive branch.
18
  Currently the President’s party is the majority in both the House 
and the Senate, allowing her party to take control of the Judiciary would result in a de facto 
hyper-presidency. 
I saw The Counsel as an effective safeguard from the Hyper-Presidency problem as well 
as a great compromise and example of collaboration. The Counsel keeps the judicial branch – to 
a certain degree – away from the reach and control of the executive branch. Additionally, its 
appointment system allows for collaboration from all sectors of the government including the 
public. Absent its administration of the budget it conceptually feels like a model that could 
provide qualified judges that that independence as well as a degree of accountability to its people 
and not only a specific political institution.  
In this paper I want to analyze the different models of judicial appointments systems in 
several parts of the world and come to a determination of which is the most effective model for 
new democracies. Part I will address the judicial system itself, its function and importance in the 
democratic system as well as the importance of judicial review and the elements that are 
necessary in order to have a judiciary that is able to do its duty effectively: that of interpreting 
what the law is. Part II I will discuss the four models seen around the world: appointment by a 
judiciary itself, appointment by a judicial council, appointment by political institution, and, 
                                                          
16
 Casa Rosada – Presidencia de la Nación Argentina. Plan para la democratización de la Justicia: Palabras de la 
Presidenta. Mar. 1, 2013. http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/discursos/26421-plan-para-la-democratizacion-de-la-
justiciapalabras-de-al-presidenta.  
17
 Id.  
18
 La oposición denuncia que es un intento de controlar la Justicia. Clarín.com – Política. Apr. 9, 2013. 
http://www.clarin.com/politica/oposicion-denuncia-intento-controlar-Justicia_0_898110227.html 
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selection through an electoral system.   Part III will elaborate on the best model needed to 
maintain a stable democracy with a true balance between all the branches, specially an 
independent and accountable judiciary. Part IV will summarize my findings as well as provide a 
conclusion of my findings. I believe that a model such as the one Argentina has developed is an 
effective safeguard from the plague of Hyper-Presidencies, as well as a solution to bipartisan 
fighting and judicial vacancies.   If other countries adopt such a model they are more likely to 
have a governmental system with a separate independent judiciary that is out of the grasp of both 
the executive and legislative branch.  
II. The Judicial System 
In an analysis of an appointment model we must first address what the judicial system is as 
well as its function and authority within a government.  The judicial system is the organ in a 
government that is dedicated to interpretation of the law. At its highest level of jurisprudence 
court systems [more often than not], mirror in function and form the United States Supreme 
Court, whose duty is to interpret the law as they see fit in accordance to the Constitution. Chief 
Justice John Marshall famously reasoned in Marbury v. Madison that, "It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."
 19
 Adding strength to this principle, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the court held that it was the judicial branch’s duty to “expound” the 
Constitution and determine whether something is within the constitutional limits or not.
20
  It can 
be safely said that the principles and application of judicial review and constitutional 
                                                          
19
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, at 177 (1803).  
20
 It is also, in some degree, warranted; by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its 
receiving a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding. M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407, at 407 (1819). 
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interpretation have been universally accepted and engrained in American jurisprudence as well 
as the jurisprudence of other countries that have similar governmental systems.  
Once we have established the power of judicial review we must address the judicial 
independence that is needed to have an effective, fair, and impartial judiciary. Judicial 
independence encompasses the view that interpretation of the law should be independent of 
pressure from both the political branches and the public.
21
 This independence aids in a fair and 
accurate interpretation of what the law is in accordance to the constitution.  Judicial 
independence is the central goal in most if not all legal systems.
22
  The theory is that the method 
in which a judge is appointed is determinative of the independence he or she possesses in making 
their rulings.
23
  Scholars, politicians, and even judges themselves disagree as to what the best 
method is in attaining this independence is; the lack of a uniform system begins to explain why 
so many different models exists. 
The trouble begins in that judicial independence can be interpreted in a variety of ways. The 
different types of judicial independence that are needed begin to explain why governments have 
come up with so many different models of judicial appointments.  Judicial independence 
includes independence from the other branches of government.
24
 Judges should be free to tell the 
executive and legislative branch when they are surpassing their authority without fear of reprisal 
or repercussion.
25
 Independence from political ideology or public pressure is another form of 
independence that is needed; this is known as the counter-majoritarian interest.
26
 Lastly judges 
                                                          
21
 Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 989 (1996). 
22
 Id.  
23
 Sanchez, Laura Patallo, The Role of the Judiciary in Post- Castro-Cuba: Recommendations for Change. Institute 
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami. ISBN: 0-9704916-7-0. Published in 2003.  
24
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org. 
25
 Id.  
26
 Id.  
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require individual independence, independence that protects them from their judicial superiors.
27
 
While the justice system is bound by the principles of stare decisis and precedent judges 
nonetheless require individual independence to assure them that they can make their decisions 
without any pressure and or reprisal from their superiors.
28
 These different forms of 
independence are needed in order for a judicial system to meet its function that of an independent 
body dedicated to the interpretation of law. 
 I mentioned the counter-majoritarian interest above. One of the greatest duties of the 
judiciary is to protect the minority interest against the majority when the majority goes beyond 
the limits of the constitution, and or there is an insufficient reason to uphold it. American 
jurisprudence has relied on Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4 in US v. Carolene Products, to 
reason that different levels of review can be applied depending on what is being interpreted 
higher levels of scrutiny should be applied when legislation is aimed at “discrete and insular 
minorities” who lack the normal protections of political process. It is in these circumstances that 
the judiciary must apply a heightened standard of review in order to protect those that will be 
adversely affected as result of being outside the majority interest. 
29
 The United States 
interpreted by developing a system of tiered review to be applied in determining the 
constitutionally of a piece of a legislation, the use and application tiered review granted the court 
a form of independence. Depending on the law being analyzed and whom or what it affects will 
determine the level of scrutiny that the court will apply in determining its constitutionality. The 
three levels of judicial review from “lowest” to “highest” are rational review, intermediate 
                                                          
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Footnote 4: “….Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at 
particular religious… or national… or racial minorities… whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938). 
  Plascencia 11 
 
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. The uses of these tiers of review are what allow judges to rule against 
the counter-majoritarian interest. 
Allowing judges the use of tiers of review is the procedural mechanism that gives judges the 
independence they need from the public in order to rule against laws that might harm minorities.  
Without such independence judges would be left without reference to a rule of law that would 
allow them to use their power and would therefore leave the minority unprotected from the status 
quo and legislation that is aimed at harming them.    
Accountability from the court is another necessary element that is requires of a fair, just and 
qualified judiciary.
30
  Just like the executive and legislative branches the judicial branch requires 
a level of accountability to the people as well as the other branches government. In the United 
States once a federal judge is appointed, he or she can keep their position so long as they have 
good behavior; this usually translates to a life-appointment.
31
 In fact, it is rare that a judicial 
system in which “good behavior” is the standard by which judges keep this position will result in 
anything other than a life appointment.
32
 While the counter-majoritarian interest is an important 
element, accountability is another important interest that is needs to be addressed. Accountability 
is needed to deter from having a judiciary that is too elitist and far removed from the society it 
lives in. Furthermore, others argue that in making accountability an important factor in 
appointing judges the result is a judiciary that is more representative of the society it lives in 
specifically with regards to race, gender and political and religious affiliation.
33
 Accountability 
with regards to the political institutions is important in that it is needed to give the executive and 
                                                          
30
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org. 
31
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, The Executive Branch.   
32
 My research revealed that all countries that have a similar clause in their constitution interpret like the United 
States into something that is a life-time appointment, absent of course extraordinary circumstance.  
33
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org. 
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legislative branches the authority [should the need arise] to take action with judicial branch 
should it extend or abuse its power. 
Another highly indicative factor that plays into the type of judicial appointment model a 
country adopts is that of history.
34
 Every county has its own unique and different history, a 
history that shaped the type of government it has today.
35
 History plays a determinative role not 
only the type of government a country choses but also the model of judicial appointments they 
adopt.  As I stated earlier democracy in Latin America is a relatively new phenomenon its path to 
democracy was neither easy nor effortless. A long history of corruption, coups and violent 
suppression against the opposition resulted in not only a huge distrust in the government but the 
political system itself. As a result the governments of many of these countries value 
accountability over independence.
36
 They want to demonstrate to the people that they have an 
active role in their government system and the people they appoint to it and not that their 
political system is full of foreign-educated elitists that are disconnected from the society they live 
in.
37
 On the contrary other countries in Latin America are concerned with the protection of the 
counter-majoritarian interest and they are more likely to use judicial appointment models that 
ensure a higher amount independence.   
Several characteristics encompass the ideal model, the ideal model of judicial appointments 
seems to be one in which judges are independent to interpret the law and protect against the 
counter-majoritarian interest yet are still subject to some sort of accountability mechanism that 
ensures that they do not go unchecked and are representation of the society they live in. Judicial 
                                                          
34
 Interview with the Hon. Jorge Luis Ballasteros, Federal Criminal Appellate Judge to Chamber Nº2., Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id.  
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independence and accountability create a tension that looks like two arrows or magnets pulling 
against each other. This tension that is created between the two begins to explain why there is 
such a diversity of models around the world. A specific country’s adoption of a judicial model is 
indicative of the characteristics that they value more.   A perfect model would be one that would 
balance the reaching a moderate middle ground.    
III. FOUR Models  
My research has revealed four different models of judicial appointments: appointment by a 
judiciary itself, appointment by a judicial council, appointment by political institution, and, 
selection through an electoral system. The models range in application in each country 
nonetheless all the countries mentioned adopt a model. As it was explained in the introduction 
each country is unique in the circumstances that lead to the type of government it has.  Some, 
like Mexico, have tried to adopt a government system that functions as closely as possible to the 
government of the United States, goes as far as having a constitution very similar to the one our 
framers made; and others like the China have created its own hybrid system that seems to 
encompass every type of model presented.      
  Plascencia 14 
 
a. Appointment by the judiciary itself  
A system of self-appointment is one which the judiciary itself appoints its judges, without 
the need for approval from any of the other political institutions or popular election.
38
 Two 
countries follow a version of this model are China and Saudi Arabia. Proponents of this model 
argue that such a system guarantees the greatest amount of independence needed by judges.
39
 
They are not only independent from other political institutions but also independent from the 
public.
40
  It goes without saying that the main criticism of this model is the lack of accountability 
it has.
41
 It is because of this concern of that such a model is in decline. Nonetheless it is worth 
mentioning due to the fact that it is the model that seems to provide the greatest amount of 
independence, an element that all models want to encompass to some degree or the other.  
In China the Chief Justice is appointed by the People's National Congress to term 5-year 
term, limited to two consecutive 5-year terms. Other justices and judges are nominated by the 
chief justice and appointed by the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress.
42
  
While the justices do the initial appointment a judge’s retention is based on their ability to get 
elected via the popular vote. 
43
 China has delegated the appointment of judges to the legislative 
and judicial branches. The part that is confusing about China’s model and makes it hard to place 
is that regardless of the system of retention elections all nominations are made by the judicial 
branch. Moreover, the nominees for potential judges are provided by an independent judicial 
council that is made up entirely of judges.  
                                                          
38
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Greg R. Avino, China’s Judiciary: An Instrument of Democratic Change?, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 369, 
379.  
43
 Id.  
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In Saudi Arabia the High Court chief and chiefs of the High Court Circuit are appointed 
by royal decree following the recommendation of the Supreme Judiciary Council, a 10-member 
body of high level judges and other judicial heads.
44
  New judges and assistant judges serve 1- 
and 2- year probations, respectively, before permanent assignment.
45
 While on its face it appears 
that the appointment is done by the executive branch (The King), the people that he appoints are 
based on the recommendation made to him by a judicial council that is entirely compromised of 
judges. The judges in this council ultimately select the individuals that the monarch will appoint. 
Moreover at the end of the probation period the judges are reviewed by yet another panel of 
judges.
46
 Therefore, not only is the appointment of judges a power that is held by the judiciary 
but the power of retention is also one that is held by the judiciary. Taking into context the history 
of Saudi Arabia, in which historically this was a power solely delegated to the monarch, this is in 
essence a way in which the King is sharing with other branches of government. Nonetheless it is 
still not one that is in any degree given to the people or the legislature. Saudi Arabia seems to be 
making other proactive efforts at reforming and modernizing its judicial systems.
47
 In addition to 
adopting more modern technology the Saudi government aims to appoint more judges as well as 
an intensive training programs and the introduction of electronic monitoring to ensure 
transparency.
48
 Saudi Arabia is a special case considering that it is not only a secular country but 
also one that is governed by a monarch. It is therefore not surprising that it wouldn’t hold the 
principle of accountability and impartiality and as a necessary element.  Even then it seems to 
                                                          
44
 Saudi Arabia Const. Chapter 6, The Authorities of the State, art. 52:  The appointment of judges and the 
termination of their duties are carried out by Royal decree by a proposal from the Higher Council of Justice in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. 
45
 Id.  
46
 Ansary, Abdullah Fakhry. Saudi Judicial Reform and the Principle of Independence. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. May 5, 2009.  
47
 Id. 
48
 New regulations to strengthen Kingdom’s judicial system. Arab News. Nov. 26, 2013. 
http://www.arabnews.com/news/483346 
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making efforts at modernizing and adopting a model that creates greater independence and 
accountability in the judicial branch.
49
   
This model is completely two-fold, it allows for complete independence while ridding 
itself of any accountability. In a self-appointing system judges are able to make ruling free from 
any pressures from political institutions and the public. However freedom comes with a complete 
lack of accountability which could lead to abuse of power and discretion. This is obviously the 
opposite extreme to a system in which all judges are elected both of which should be avoided 
due to the negative consequences they are likely to create. Historically, this model was 
commonly used however, with the increase of democracies around the world and as well as an 
increased demand for accountability that this model as well as any versions of it are largely in 
decline.
50
  
b. Appointment by a judicial council  
The appointment by judicial council as was mentioned earlier in reference to Argentina, is 
model in which an independent council creates the shortlist of nominees for judgeship, those lists 
are then given to either of the political institutions (Legislative or Executive) designated with the 
authority to make an official nomination.
51
 Traditionally, the council is compromised of 
appointed officials from the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and academics.
52
  
Modifications to this model exist such as the model used in China as explained above.
53
 
                                                          
49
 Ansary, Abdullah Fakhry. Saudi Judicial Reform and the Principle of Independence. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. May 5, 2009. 
50
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 China’s judicial council is made up entirely of judges.  
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Appointment by judicial council is currently the most popular model used around the world; 
about 60% of the countries use this version of the model or a modification of it.
54
   
Incorporated into the constitutional reform of 1994, Argentina adopted the appointment by 
judicial council model.
55
 El Consejo de la Magistratura de la República Argentina (Counsel of 
Magistrates of the Republic of Argentina) is an integrated multispectral constitutional organ, 
responsible for making the shortlists of candidates to the judicial branch, they are also 
responsible for the sanctioning and firing of judges.
56
 Regulated by Article 114 of the National 
Constitution, it requires that The Counsel be integrated in such a way that all branches of the 
government are represented; it is therefore compromised of a thirteen-member council of judges, 
legislators, lawyers, and law professors.
57
 The use of a council and the use of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee can confuse some in that they seem to have the same function. Upon the 
recommendation of the council, the President appoints the nominee to the bench with 
confirmation of two-thirds of the Senate.
58
  
                                                          
54
 United States Institute of the Peace, Judicial Appointments and Judicial Independence: Jan. 2009, www.usip.org. 
55
 Hidalgo, Dr. Enrique. Consejo de la Magistratura. Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación: República 
Argentina. Instituto de Capacitación Parlamentaria. at 3. 
http://www.diputados.gov.ar/secparl/icap/publicaciones/glosario/C/consejoMagistratura.html. 
56
 Consejo de la Magistratura – Poder de la Nación. http://www.consejomagistratura.gov.ar/index.php/features/ique-
es-el-consejo 
57
 Arg. Const. Chapter III, § 114: The Council of the Magistracy, ruled by a special law enacted by the absolute 
majority of all the members of each House, shall be in charge of the selection of the judges and of the administration 
of the Judicial Power. The Council shall be periodically constituted so as to achieve the balance among the 
representation of the political bodies arising from popular election, of the judges of all instances, and of the lawyers 
with federal registration. It shall likewise be composed of such other scholars and scientists as indicated by law in 
number and form. It is empowered:  
1. To select the candidates to the lower courts by public competition.  
2. To issue proposals in binding lists of three candidates for the appointment of the judges of the lower courts.  
3. To be in charge of the resources and to administer the budget assigned by law to the administration of 
justice.  
4. To apply disciplinary measures to judges.  
5. To decide the opening of the proceedings for the removal of judges, when appropriate to order their 
suspension, and to make the pertinent accusation.  
6. To issue the rules about the judicial organization and all those necessary to ensure the independence of 
judges and the efficient administration of justice.  
58
 Arg. Const. Chapter III, Powers of the Executive Branch, §99, ¶4.  
  Plascencia 18 
 
The Counsel’s function and administration in Argentina has been widely criticized in recent 
years, particularly with the power it has in the administration of the judicial budget.
59
  Opponents 
of the counsel state that the power and control that the Counsel has over the judicial branch gives 
it too much unchecked power, something that is felt more at the municipal level than the federal, 
since it is these courts that are normally subject to the greatest budget cuts.
60
 Additionally, in 
recent years the counsel has focused much of its time and energy in the administration of the 
budget practically ignoring its duties with regards to the nomination of judges.
61
 This has created 
several vacancies and a back-log in the judicial system.
62
 Criticism has led to discussion and 
even active efforts to get rid of the counsel altogether.
63
 Opponents also argue that its process is 
slow and antidemocratic since those that are appointed to the council are not members elected by 
the public. In simplest terms the President argues that the counsel functions like a fourth branch 
of the government and the people have zero influence over it.
64
  
Paraguay also uses a judicial counsel.
65
 However, in Paraguay in accordance with Article 
251 are appointed by the Supreme Court itself in accordance with a recommendation by the 
Council of Magistrates, a 9-member independent body.
66
 Like Argentina the designation of the 
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members of the council are specifically mandated in the constitution.
67
  The difference between 
this system and Argentina’s is that recommended justices are appointed by the President whereas 
in Paraguay the appointment is made by the members of the Supreme Court.
68
 Also, unlike 
Argentina, they do not have the constitutional authority over the administration of the judicial 
system and its budget.  
In Spain, a parliamentary democracy, the General Council of the Judiciary, a 20-member 
body chaired by the monarch and includes presidential appointees, lawyers and jurists elected by 
the National Assembly proposes the judges to be appointed by the King to the Supreme Court.
69
 
The General Council of the Judiciary is not a jurisdictional body and has a lot of the same duties 
that the Counsel in Argentina has, including overseeing and inspecting the activities of judges 
and courts.
70
 The similarities between the council are obvious in the Argentina modeled its own 
council after the Spanish model.
71
  
It is important to note that an identifying trait of this model is that while is it made up of 
appointed members, the council itself is independent and separate from any of the political 
branches. The Council’s investigatory power is broad, and reviews materials in support and 
against potential nominees regardless of who submitted them. Its investigation phase works in a 
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manner very similar to the Unites States Senate Judiciary Committee.
72
  Potential nominees can 
apply for judgeship or be brought to the attention of the council by an individual, themselves, 
one of the political institutions or a fellow member of the council.
73
  
The existence of an extensive investigation by an independent council is important to a lot of 
countries that have historically dealt with corruption, specifically corruption from judges that 
were known to take bribes and or prosecute people with little or no evidence.
74
 This is 
particularly the case in Latin America and helps to explain why the model is popular in this 
region. Evidence showed that a strong correlation exists between the judicial appointments, and 
the state of judicial corruption.
75
 Findings such as these, as well as a history of corruption lead 
aided in Latin America’s path to democracy and the new established government systems that 
reform would occur.
76
 The effect of that promise resulted in the widespread use of the judicial 
council.
77
  
The use of the judicial council, at least in theory, protects against giving too much power to a 
political institution more specifically the judiciary itself while still allowing for a great amount of 
judicial independence. Judicial council’s made up entirely of members from one of the political 
institutions dilutes and its purpose and gives too much power to one branch of government. 
Likewise, giving the judicial council the task of administering and balancing the judicial budget 
dilutes its purpose, that of coming up with qualified potential nominees to the bench. The 
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appointment by the judicial council sits somewhere in the middle of the independence 
accountability spectrum leaning towards independence. 
c. Appointment by political institution  
The appointment by political institution model, one of the branches of government [either the 
executive or legislative branch] or political institutions has the authority to appoint judges.
78
  
Appointments are typically made upon the recommendation of an organization like the American 
Bar Association (ABA) or other similar affiliated organization.
79
 Once that recommendation is 
made either the executive or legislative branch, whichever has the authority, nominates the 
individual.  Upon the confirmation or approval of the other political institution the individual is 
then officially appointed to the bench.
80
 Appointments under this model are usually for life, 
absent of course, some extraordinary circumstance.
81
  Some of the countries that follow this 
model include the Unites States, South Africa, Australia, Belgium, Brazil and Mexico.  
Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution, grants the President the authority to 
nominate a judge with the advice and consent of the Senate.
82
 Upon the nomination of the 
President the Senate Judiciary Committee, a sub-committee of the Senate, holds a hearing in 
which the nominee has the opportunity to give their testimony as well as be questioned by the 
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members of the committee.
83
 Once approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee nominees are 
then referred to the Senate for full consideration.
84
  If a majority of the Senate votes in favor of a 
nomination, the nomination is then confirmed by the President.
85
 In accordance with Article III 
of the Constitution, judges “shall hold their Offices during good behavior”, which usually 
translates to a life-time term or self-mandated retirement.
86
  
Russia uses a system very similar to the United States in which potential members are 
nominated by the president and appointed by the Federation Council (Legislature); selected 
members are appointed for life.
87
 Additionally, Mexico’s appointment model is very similar to 
that of the United States.  Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the 
Senate’s approval.88 District and other federal judges including magistrates are appointed by 
members of the Supreme Court for a 4 year term, upon the completion of the four year term they 
can either dismissed upon proof of bad behavior, elevated or moved to different district.
89
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While some countries like the United States and Mexico use life-time appointments other 
countries enforce mandatory retirement ages.  Those that support mandatory retirement ages say 
are necessary to avoid having an aging court and more importantly open up seats for women and 
minorities to the bench.
90
 Those that oppose it say that in enforcing a mandatory retirement age, 
takes away from judicial independence.
91
 This point is usually countered with the fact people are 
living longer, therefore judges are serving longer too, too long and this results in too much 
control and influence to one individual for an extended period of time.
92
  
South Africa is one of the countries that have imposed a mandatory retirement age. In 
South Africa the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Appeals are appointed by 
the national president upon the consultation of the Joint Service Commission (JSC).
93
 
Additionally, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the national president after consultation 
with the Chief Justice and leaders of the National Assembly for 12-year non-renewable terms or 
until age 70.
94
 In Brazil justices are appointed by the president and approved by the Federal 
Senate; upon appointment can serve until mandatory retirement at the age of 70.
95
  
Other countries bypass approval from another political institution and designate the 
power to appoint to only one of the political institutions.
96
 Proponents of this model state that it 
allows for judicial independence in that the less other institutions are involved the more likely 
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the judicial branch will feel it is accountable to them. Opponents counter that this modification 
gives too much power to one of the political institutions effectively making the judicial branch 
an extension of whichever institution has the power to appoint. In Australia appointment is solely 
the responsibility of the executive branch and does not require the approval of the legislative 
branch as is the case in the United States.
97
 Justices in Australia are appointed by the governor-
general in council for life with mandatory retirement at age 70.
98
  Similarly in Canada judges are 
appointed by the Prime Minister (head of the Executive Branch) and can serve for life or until 
mandatory retirement at the age of 75.
99
  
Countries that have an active monarchy also frequent the appointment by political 
institution model. In Belgium the King appoints Justices of the Peace, judges of the superior 
courts, and judges of the court of Cassation.
100
 Constitutional Court judges are appointed from 
the monarch from candidates submitted by parliament.
101
  Supreme Court judges are appointed 
by the monarch from candidates submitted by the High Council of Justice.
102
 Therefore in 
Belgium while the appointment is done by The King, the nomination is done by either the 
legislative or judicial branch depending on the judge.  
The “advice and consent” clause as is used in the United States seems to work as a 
safeguard that neither branch overexerts its power, staying true to the principle of separation of 
powers.  In Federalist 76, Hamilton explained that while the President had the power to nominate 
he is not given the absolute power of appointment: “…. every advantage would in substance, be 
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derived from the power of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while 
several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that 
officer would be avoided.”103 Additionally, Senate confirmation was viewed as a check on the 
partiality of the Executive as well as a check on the self-interest and impulsiveness of the 
president while protecting against appointment of unqualified candidates.
104
   
The single-institution appointment model seems to allow for a great amount of judicial 
independence. It bases itself on the theory that in being appointed, justices will not be afraid to 
go against public opinion and protecting minorities against the counter-majoritarian interest.
105
 
Arguments against this model is that it fundamentally antidemocratic and results in an elitist 
judiciary.
106
  
The anti-democratic argument bases itself on the fact that both the judicial council and 
those that are appointed under it have zero involvement from the people; the lack of 
accountability it creates is contrary to what many people of the countries that use it want in the 
judicial system.
107
  Additionally, it is argued this it is highly elitist; in that on its face it appears 
that so long as someone knows the right people and is at the right place at the right time they will 
become a judge, and only those that are connected to the political machinery make it to the 
bench.
108
  Such a model results in a judiciary that is entirely disconnected from society and 
makes their decisions based entirely too much on legal theory and not experience to real life 
situations. The practice of lifetime appointments can lead to an abuse of power and pushing of 
political agendas. As it was shown above many countries such as Australia, South Africa, and 
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Brazil have addressed this concern by forcing imposing lifetime appointments coupled with a 
mandatory retirement age, usually ranging between 65 and 70 years of age.   
Countries such as Bolivia have taken proactive efforts to address concerns of a 
disconnected elitist judiciary by adopting a model of judicial elections.
109
 As it will be addressed 
below, in 2011; Bolivia adopted a model of judicial elections.  Countries like China have taken a 
more modified pseudo hybrid approach that adopts both appointments by political institution as 
well as an election system.  In China judges are appointed for by the judicial branch itself after 
two years on the bench should they want to retain their seat they then have to run for office based 
on their record and accomplishments.   
The appointment by political institution model allows for a vast amount of independence 
yet the difficulty in removing someone from office absent “good behavior” rids it of needed 
accountability. While there are various arguments in favor of age cap as a safeguard I can’t say 
that agree with them with the need for them in the first place. I find that so long as a judge is in 
good behavior and does his or her job well, age should not be an impediment. An analysis of this 
model leads me to conclude that it lies somewhere towards the middle of the independence- 
accountability spectrum leaning towards more a model whose main goal is concern judicial 
independence versus accountability. 
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d. Selection through an electoral system  
Electoral systems gained popularity in the 19
th
 century as a way to enhance accountability 
for judges that were considered to be too elitist and disconnected from society.
110
 There are two 
main types of election systems: popular election (partisan or non-partisan) and election by the 
legislature.
111
 Election by the legislature is a model in which the legislative branch itself elects its 
judges; Cuba uses such a model. There is a third model of election that is worth mentioning, 
known as retention elections.
112
 Retention elections involve initial appointment by a political 
institution for specified amount of time upon whose completion the judge must run in the general 
election in order to keep or retain his or her seat. China follows this model of initial appointment 
followed by election in order to retain his or her seat. 
113
 The election of judges’ model allows 
for the people to directly elect their judges. Proponents say it provides the greatest amount of 
accountability to the people, giving them the power into determining what kind of judiciary they 
want. Opponents say that such a model runs the risk politicizes the judicial branch and hampers 
the quality of judges that make it to the bench.     
Recent changes in Bolivia as well as an amendment to its constitution resulted in the 
transition from a judicial council model to an election model.  Article 182 Number I, of the 
Bolivian Constitution, grants the people of Bolivia the power to elect its judges.
114
 The election 
model is non-partisan as anyone who runs cannot be a part of any of the political parties.
115
 The 
amendment was made to the constitution was made after the successful referendum spear-headed 
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by Bolivian President, Evo Morales. As a result of this referendum Bolivia held its first judicial 
elections in 2011.
116
  Judges of the Supreme Court and the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal 
are elected from a list of pre-selected candidates made by the Legislative Assembly, those that 
win serve 6 year-terms.
117
 Bolivia’s move towards this model is a byproduct of the 
reconceptualization of democracy the country has gone through in the last ten years. As well as 
increased participation from the indigenous population of this country who has historically been 
marginalized.
118
 The election of the indigenous Evo Morales fueled a continued move towards 
the left as well as more participation from the people.
119
 The people of Bolivia have chosen 
accountability as an element they desire in their government. They want direct influence and 
control over all aspects of government not only the executive and legislative branches.  
The successful referendum demonstrated that the people of Bolivia as well as its 
government hold accountability as a valuable asset. It is speculated that such an extreme 
approach is a consequence of decades of marginalization and suppression paired with Evo 
Morales’ aim to “decolonize” Bolivia.120  Thus far, the people of Bolivia as well as its 
government seem content with results that judicial elections have provided.  For the most part it 
has met it has accomplished some of its biggest objectives those of having more women as well 
as individuals of indigenous decent on the bench.
121
 As explained in the appointment by judicial 
council section, earlier this year Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner presented a 
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proposal to the Argentine Assembly recommending that Argentina modify, or better yet, 
abandon the use of the judicial counsel and adopt a model of judicial elections. Kirchner’s 
“Democratización de la Justicia” (Democratization of Justice) is an attempt to “democratize 
justice” by adopting a model similar to that of Bolivia.122 The referendum was approved by the 
legislature however; the Supreme Court found the referendum to be unconstitutional reasoning 
that: “it is not possible to invoke the defense of the popular will in order to ignore the judicial 
order”.123 Despite its declared unconstitutionality the executive branch of Argentina continues to 
advocate for this change even reaching the point of suggesting a constitutional amendment in 
lieu of its failed attempt at changing the model via referendum.
124
 While Kirchner has recently 
lost support in the polls she continues to have a strong support base among the poor and lower 
middle class citizens of Argentina, additionally her party currently has control of both houses of 
the Senate. It is yet to be seen if her continued efforts to modify they system will yield any 
results in her favor.  
Cuba, a country with a one-party system also used a form of judicial election, in a model 
in which the legislative branch elects judges.
125
   Article 75 (o) of the Cuban Constitution grants 
the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (National Assembly of People’s Power) the power to 
elect judges to serve 2.5-year terms.
126
 Lay judges are nominated workplace collectives and 
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neighborhood association and elected by municipal and provincial assemblies.
127
 The Cuban 
constitution affirmatively grants judges the power of judicial review as well their independence 
from other political institutions, while also adding that judges can only be removed by the body 
which elected them.
128
 Article 122 specifically gives judges the power of judicial review and 
well as their independence from other political institutions.
129
  
The biggest argument in favor of this model is that, like any other election system it a 
true indication of the popular will. They key and most prominent element of this model is the 
accountability it creates. It therefore makes sense that countries that have adopted this model 
have done so after a history of vast corruption in its government and more specifically the 
judiciary. Elections directly address the concerns against elitists’ judiciaries that are disconnected 
from society and are therefore not a true representation of the society they live in. Opponents 
also argue that such a system can open up the possibility of having more minorities as well as 
women on the bench.
130
 
The major concern with the election of judges is the politicization of the judicial 
system.
131
 Concerns in politicizing the judiciary are the same those that come up with elections 
in the executive and legislative branches.  Running for office requires money, and a lot of it, 
increasingly its costing more and more money to run for office. This need for capital rids the 
system of the accountability it claims to have, over concerns that judges will lose impartiality 
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towards their biggest contributors or even worse their biggest opponents.
132
 What degree of 
accountability can a judge be held to when of the lawyers or a party before him happens to be 
one of his biggest contributors.
133
 Many states have responded to this concern by regulating 
judicial campaigns through codes of judicial ethics.
134
 As we saw Bolivia has addressed some of 
these concerns in mandating that those that run are not a part of political party.  
Another concern with judicial elections is that the best qualified candidate does not win 
always only the one that received the most votes.
135
 Election results are not based on merit and 
qualifications, they are more indicative of likeability and popularity. This brings into question 
the quality of the bench and the accuracy of the rulings they make. This does not in any sense 
translate to accountability, rather is mirrors something more similar to that of winning a race. 
Evidence also suggests that judges become more putative in election-years, rationalizing that in 
being viewed as harsher on crime they are more likely to be re-elected.
136
 While it may appear 
that this model provides for the greatest amount of accountability, research shows that 
accountability is achieved at the cost of impartiality and on occasion quality of judges.  
As it was explained above in the appointment by political institution section, the initial 
appointment of judges in China and is done by the Executive branch for a defined amount of 
time (2 years) and upon the completion of that term they must win in the general election in 
order to hold their seat.
137
 The amount of independence and impartiality provided by this model 
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is highly questionable, while the initial appointment indicates that judicial independence is 
possible the fact that judges will be subject to election can make the 2-year term something short 
of a resume builder. This could lead to extremely putative judges as well as impartial judges that 
only rule in accordance with the goal of being elected and not applying the law in an unbiased 
and fair way.   
The election of judges does not satisfy the goals it aims to meet. It does not allow for 
accountability nor rid it of the elitist aspect that those that came up with this model aimed to 
battle. Quite the contrary it creates a system in which only the most popular person running wins 
which is not always the best judge bringing into question the quality of the bench. Politicization 
of the judicial system is essence the least preferred model that a government should use. It does 
not stick true to the principles and spirit of a judiciary, that of a fair, qualified, independent 
judicial system that freedom to interpret the law in a fair and just manner.  
IV. Best Model - Hybrid 
When I first found out about the use of judicial councils it felt like I had stumbled upon 
conceptual legal gold mine. Needless to say while the way in which judicial councils have 
carried out in many are not exactly those that I would suggest the United States attempt to 
emulate.  An analysis of what and why certain things happened in some of these countries 
provides us with great insight as to what works and what does not. I have stated time and time 
again I stated that an ideal judicial system is one that balances independence and accountability. 
My goal was to find a model that would provide that. My research revealed that none of these 
models provide that balance. At this point I would like to suggest a fifth model: a hybrid of the 
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use of the judicial council with appointment by a political institution; more specifically 
appointment by the executive branch with the advice and consent of the Senate.  In practice a 
shortlist of candidates would be submitted by an independent council of appointed members by 
to the President who would then appoint a nominee with the consent and advice of the Senate. 
Essentially a hybrid of the models used in the United States and judicial council similar to that of 
Argentina and Spain. 
Members of the judicial council would be made up of appointed members from the 
executive, legislative and judicial branch as well as law professors and a law student. The range 
of members would provide a range of points of view from all aspects of the legal field. I 
considered the idea of suggesting that one of the members of the council be one that is elected by 
the people. However, the practicality of how such an election would pan out, as well as the 
potential cost it would require would outweigh any benefit or essence it might provide.  
Additionally, those that would opt to run would very likely be members of the Senate or 
judiciary de facto throwing off the representational the balance between the branches. It would 
be in the council’s best interest as well as the judicial system itself that any form of election 
system be excluded. A student in lieu of an elected member would be able to provide a 
somewhat heightened layman perspective and be able to understand the complexity and 
intricacies of the council as well as the depth required in the investigation process required to 
come up with potential nominees.  
 The appointment method by the executive legislative and judicial branch would be 
entirely left up to them. In order to maintain a balance between the branches of government the 
council should be comprised of the following. Appointed members of the judicial branch should 
be a federal judge and a state judge. Additionally a member of the Democratic and Republic 
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party should be appointed by the legislative branch. Law professors should be appointed from a 
public school and private school,  special attention should be made that not only members of Ivy 
League schools be continuously appointed. The Executive branch would also get to appoint two 
members preferably both of whom would have a law degree or are practicing attorneys. With 
regards to the student, his or her appointment would be decided by the judicial council itself, it 
would be their responsibility to hire a student for a one-year term from applications received. 
Since this would be considered a federal job the student would have to be a U.S. citizen. Aside 
from the one-year term for the student all other appointments would serve a single 2-year term. 
The exception to this would be the student on the council, who would qualify for appointment by 
any of the political institutions should the situation arise. Additionally, once an individual is 
appointed, they would not qualify for appointment by either the branch who initially appointed 
them or any other branch. For example, if a member of the executive branch was appointed and 
then he or she ran for public office he or she would not be able to be appointed as a member of 
the legislative branch.  In all this would create a 9-member council representing all facets of the 
legal world.  
 In adopting the use of the judicial council there are things that need to be avoided. The 
two that are most significant are: not giving the judicial council the authority to administer and 
manage the budget of the judicial branch, and not allowing an imbalance of members to the 
council from any of the political institutions. These two should be avoided, as evidence has 
shown these two practices are what seem to be creating the greatest critique and concern of 
judicial councils in the countries that use them. In Argentina for example, The Counsel’s ability 
to administer and manage the budget of the judicial system has sidetracked them from their 
superior goal: that of coming up with shortlists. This practice has tarnished its reputation and 
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credibility as among the public as well as given the executive branch the ammunition it needs to 
attempt to get control of The Counsel. With regards to an imbalance of members to the council, 
we would want to avoid situations like China and Saudi Arabia, in which the councils are solely 
compromised of members of the judicial branch. This should be avoided for varying reasons. In 
allowing for the council to be compromised of too many members from one branch we run the 
risk of giving too much power to one branch of government, throwing off the balance needed in 
a true separation of powers. While a model like the one in China would provide the greatest 
amount of judicial independence, in only having deal with judges, the lack of accountability the 
model would provide would create the same effect as that of a council with the power to 
administer and manage the judiciary budget.   
The United States and the Argentina are currently dealing with the issue of judicial 
vacancies. Both for different reasons however, it is my theory that effective and specifically 
tailored use of the judicial council would alleviate this problem. The best way to address such a 
problem would be have the council continuously work on finding potential nominees to be added 
to the shortlist.  Going as far as giving the judicial council quotas with regards to potential 
nominees would be too much and run the risk of decreasing the quality of individuals 
recommended. What should not be allowed is waiting for vacancies to come up. Instead a 
proactive system in which qualified nominees are constantly being investigated would aid in the 
judicial vacancy problem. In establishing this practice the United States would be to more 
efficiently fill a vacant seat in that shortlist of qualified judges would be readily available for the 
President.  
Finding balance between independence and accountability has been a constant theme in this 
paper. History and a country’s path to democracy have also been established as a detrimental 
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element that shapes the model that is ultimately adopted.  We are a blessed country in that we 
haven’t had to deal with judicial corruption, coups, and hyper-presidencies the way other 
countries have. To me that has translated into a country the values independence in its judicial 
system versus accountability.  However, something that we do value is efficiency. We like things 
done well, and like them to be done in a timely manner. A model such as the one I have 
suggested would provide this much desired efficiency.   
In addition to adopting the use of the judicial council I would suggest one change to the 
advice and consent clause. While I support the use of the filibuster, I believe when it is used a 
reason for it use must be provided. A reluctance to work with members of the opposing party 
should not be enough reason to filibuster. Instead when used a valid good faith reason for it must 
be given.  In turn the adoption of the judicial council and its investigatory process would preempt 
any valid good faith reasons that might be provided. Being that the nominees would have already 
gone through a rigorous investigation and testimony hearing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
process would be streamlined as well as the confirmation hearing.    
The benefit of this model is that that it includes and gets all branches of government 
involved.  While the general public would be kept out process of appointment members to the 
council, any election type system would overcomplicate the system and be too costly. The same 
arguments that are made against the election of judges would apply in this context.  I stand by 
my decision that an adaptation of the judicial council model into our current appointment be 
beneficial. This model creates a compromise of the principles our judicial system needs: 
independence, accountability, and efficiency.   
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V. Conclusion  
The single most important factor needed in a judicial system is that of an independent 
judiciary. As we have seen this can be achieved in a variety of ways all of which place a different 
principle at the forefront of its system. A country that wants direct accountability will adopt a 
system of judicial elections however, they run the politicizing their judicial system. Should your 
priority be judicial independence over accountability a model with a judicial council that 
nominates candidates that are then to be appointed by the either the legislature or executive is 
likely the best option. Some countries have reasoned that a system of self-appointment provides 
the greatest amount of judicial independence.  Ultimately what every country needs is are fair, 
effective, and independent judges that have a clear grasp of what the law is and will interpret it 
accordingly. The manner in which governments achieve this is directly related to the form of 
government it has, its history and path to democracy, and lastly what they prioritize more: 
accountability or independence. In a perfect world we would be able to create a perfect system. 
We do not have such a luxury, it is therefore a balancing of factors and open and candid 
discussion of the above mentioned items that will provide a country with a blue of the type of 
model they adopt.  
A collaborative system is many ways in the most appropriate method of appointment of 
judges. The ideal system is one that allows judges to be independent and not worry about the 
repercussions their holding might have on their careers. At the same time the ideal system needs 
to provide a level of accountability which would allow for recourse should judges overexert their 
power.  Any system that relies too heavily on one branch of government, is self-appointing, or 
allows for the citizenry to elect its judges tarnishes the purity of the judiciary. We need an 
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appointment process that is open and transparent while adhering to objective criteria not only in 
accord with the court and political institutions but also with the general public itself.
138
 
The role of a well-functioning judiciary is one that aids in the protection of human and 
property rights while enforcing the legal frameworks that support optimal market function.
139
 A 
well-functioning judiciary is one that has the capacity to work in a just and impartial manner. 
system. It should therefore be as independent as possible with specifically defined scope and 
authority to interpret the law.   
This paper was written with the purpose of finding the best model for judicial appointments. 
So what is the best model? At the risk of sounding too much like a law student, it depends. Yes, 
it depends on what values and principles we value and want in our judicial system.  
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